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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
eral cases in this country following the rule now established
in England which, in the case of a preceding life estate,
gives the words their unrestricted meaning and applies the
contingency to death without issue whenever it occurs.
A QUERY ABOUT PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO A DI-
RECTED VERDICT AS TO DEFENDANT'S
NEGLIGENCE
Vogelsang v. Sehlhorst'
Plaintiffs, the driver of an automobile and his passenger,
sued defendants, the owner and the driver of a taxicab, for
personal injuries sustained in a collision due to the alleged
negligence of the taxicab driver. The jury returned a ver-
dict for the plaintiffs and the defendants appealed from
judgments entered thereon. Both vehicles at the time of
the collision had been travelling west on that part of
Edmondson Avenue in Baltimore City which is classified
as a dual lane highway. The portion of the highway used
by westbound traffic is designated as a one-way street
(with signs so indicating) and is separated from the
portion for eastbound traffic by a parkway and streetcar
tracks. The automobile was proceeding next to the park-
way at a moderate speed, when the taxi driver sounded his
horn to signal his intention to pass. The automobile driver
held to the left and the cab driver then attempted to pass
on the right. The collision occurred when the taxi driver
had to swerve to his left to avoid hitting a parked car. As
he did so, the left rear fender of the cab came in contact
with the right front fender of the automobile causing it to
jump the curb of the parkway and strike a pole.
The driver of the automobile testified that the accident
was due to the fact that the cab driver cut to his left before
he had completely passed his automobile. He also testified
that if he had pulled over to the right when the taxi driver
sounded his horn, he might have hit a parked car. Both
plaintiffs asserted that the automobile did not alter its
course nor increase its speed prior to the collision. The
taxi driver admitted that he had swerved to his left to
avoid a parked car, but claimed that he had fully passed
the plaintiff's car before doing so, as he had seen the
plaintiff's lights in his rearview mirror. He did not testify
that he signaled before cutting to the left. He testified that
171 A. 2d 295 (Md. 1950).
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"the skirt" of his left rear fender was "pulled out" and
that he "pushed it down" after the collision.
Construing Sections 162 and 165 of Article 662 of the
Code,2 the Court of Appeals concluded that, by a proper
interpretation of these sections, vehicles are not required to
keep to the right on one-way streets, and that by implication
passing on the right is permitted on such streets. The auto-
mobile driver was not therefore under any duty to give way
to his right when the taxi driver sounded his horn. Nor
did the taxi driver violate the law when he attempted to
pass on the right. Therefore, the only real issue for the
consideration of the jury was whether or not both parties
exercised due care under the circumstances. In affirming
the decision below, the Court stated that the jury could
have properly found that the cab driver's negligence was
the proximate cause of the collision and that the plaintiffs
had not in any way contributed thereto. The lower court,
in its charge to the jury, instructed them that, in deciding
whether or not there had been any negligence, they were
to take into consideration the rules of law governing traffic
at the time of the accident, and read sections 164 and 165
of Article 661/2 to them. Counsel for the defendants stated,
out of the presence of the jury, that he thought the court
was going to explain these sections to the jury rather than
merely quote them, but no formal objection was taken on
the court's failure to do so. With reference to this, the Court
of Appeals said:
"The interpretation of the statute was, of course, a
question for the court and not the jury. However, in
the circumstances we do not find that the refusal to
amplify the charge was prejudicial. The fact that the
court read Section 165 to the jury was an indication
that it was applicable, and, if applicable, permitted
passing on the right if it could be done with safety.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the
jury was misled. The appellees did not contend that
the taxicab driver violated the statute in passing to
the right; the issue was whether he used due care
under the circumstances. These circumstances pointed
so strongly to negligence on his part that we think the
court might properly have directed a verdict against
him if a request had been made, for the testimony is
undisputed that the cab cut in front of the automobile
2 Md. Code Supp. (1947).
8 ibid.
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and hooked fenders. The appellants argue that it may
be inferred from the cab driver's testimony about see-
ing the lights that the automobile was behind him
when he swerved, although this is completely contra-
dicted by the physical facts, including the injury to
the skirt of the cab's left rear fender. Even accepting
that inference as a fact, there is nothing to show that
the automobile could have stopped before the contact,
or that its driver was negligent. Thus it might have
been ruled as a matter of law that the cab driver's
failure to allow sufficient clearance was the sole cause
of the accident."4
It is to be noted that no request for a directed verdict
was actually made by the plaintiffs in the court below and
neither brief considered the point of whether it would
have been proper to grant one. Nevertheless in the above
quotation, the Court of Appeals states in its opinion that it
would have been proper for the lower court, on plaintiffs'
motion, to have granted a peremptory instruction against
the defendants. It is with this portion of the opinion that
the remainder of this note will be concerned.
The Maryland rule as to when a verdict might properly
be directed in favor of a particular party litigant was clearly
stated in the case of Alexander v. Tingle.5 In that case, an
action was brought by the plaintiff-appellant, as statutory
liquidator of a reciprocal insurance exchange to enforce
an assessment against the defendant-appellee, a subscriber
to the exchange. The plaintiff showed that the assessment
had been ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction,
and offered evidence by way of witnesses and underwriting
records proving that certain insurance policies had been
issued to the defendant. The defendant had filed the gen-
eral issue plea to the declaration, but, at the trial, was only
able to testify that he did not remember about the particu-
lar policies and that he destroyed the old ones as soon as
the new ones were received by him. He did not deny that
the policies in question had in fact been issued to him. At
the close of all the evidence, the plaintiff offered a prayer
for a directed verdict in his favor. The court rejected
the prayer and the plaintiff excepted. The jury returned
a verdict for the defendant, and one of the grounds of the
appeal was the court's refusal to direct the verdict as
I Supra, n. 1, 298. Italics supplied.
5 181 Md. 464, 30 A. 2d 737 (1943).
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prayed.6 Plaintiff-appellant based his contention, that the
court erred in refusing his request for a directed verdict,
on the language of Trial Rule 4 of The General Rules
of Practice and Procedure which in part provides:
"In any proceeding tried by jury any party may
move, at the close of the evidence offered by an oppo-
nent or at the close of all the evidence, for a directed
verdict in his favor on any or all of the issues...
The Court of Appeals however held that, although"... the
language of Rule 4 is sufficiently broad to warrant the gram-
matical construction thereof urged by the appellant, it must
be read in the light of the well-established practice thereto-
fore prevailing".7 The well-settled rule, as established by
Maryland case law, was that a party bearing the burden
of proving a particular fact or issue could not get a directed
verdict that he had met the burden of proof as to that fact
or issue. The Maryland cases had clearly established the
rule that even though the evidence be practically uncon-
tradicted, the court still could not withdraw an issue from
the consideration of the jury at the motion of the party
who had the burden of proof on that issue.' The reason for
this rule, as pointed out by the Court over 100 years ago,'
is that the credibility of the witnesses, even though their
testimony be uncontradicted, is a matter which the jury,
and not the court, must determine.
But there is a difference between testimony which is
uncontradicted and facts which are uncontroverted or ad-
See n. 13, infra, for discussion of the other ground of appeal.
E* Italics supplied.
Supra, n. 5, 467.
"See, in general: ASIHMAN, DIRECTED VERDICTS AND INSTRUCTIONS (1939),
Tit. 9, Sec. 96: NILES, NOTES ON TRIAL PRACTICE, NEGLIGENCE CASES AND
EVIDENCE (1946), 15-16; POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (1925), V. II, Sees.
293-296. Cited in the decision were: Travelers Ins. Co. v. Connolly, 145
Md. 554, 125 A. 900 (1924) ; Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539,
197 A. 302 (1937) ; Calvert Bank v. Katz Co., 102 Md. 56, 61 A. 411 (1905) ;
McCosker and Malloy v. Banks, 84 Md. 292, 35 A. 935 (1896). See also:
Smith v. Whitman, 159 Md. 478, 150 A. 856 (1930) ; Pennsylvania R. Co. v.
Stallings, 165 Md. 615, 170 A. 163 (1933) citing other authorities at 619.9 In Charleston Ins. Co. v. Corner, 2 Gill 410, 426 (Md. 1844), the Court
said: "The instructions asked by the appellee, who was plaintiff below,
were not based on an assumed state of facts, to be submitted to the
consideration of the jury. They were moved, it would seem, in the con-
fidence, that as the evidence was uncontradicted, the jury would not do
otherwise than find the facts accordingly . . . Doubtless the jury would
have found these facts according to the testimony, but the sufficiency of
the evidence to satisfy the jury, or the circumstance that it is all on one
side, does not authorize the court to direct the jury that it proves the fact.
They have the power to refuse their credit, and no action of. the court
should control the exercise of their admitted right to weigh the credibility
of evidence."
1950]
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mitted. Several cases have recognized that where the
facts are undisputed, in the sense of having been agreed
upon or admitted by the opposite party and there is no
dispute as to the inferences to be drawn from them, the
court may properly withdraw such facts from the jury's
consideration, even at the instance of the party who would
normally have the burden of proving them.1° Thus Mary-
land cases have assumed that the court may direct a verdict
in the plaintiff's favor only where the facts are uncontro-
verted,11 or where the defendant has the burden of proof
as to such facts. 2 Reasoning therefrom, the Court of Ap-
peals in Alexander v. Tingle ruled that plaintiff's request
for a directed verdict was properly refused and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court,' saying:
"Our conclusion, therefore, is that the correct in-
terpretation of Rule 4 is that any party may properly
move for a directed verdict in his favor on any issue
as to which his opponent has the burden of proof,
but not for an instructed verdict on any issue as to
which the moving party has the burden of proof unless
the facts are uncontroverted or the parties have agreed
as to the facts.
10In Harrison v. Central Construction Co., 135 Md. 170, 180; 108 A.
874, 878 (1919), the Court said: "When the facts have been ascertained
and agreed upon by the parties, or are undisputed, and there is no dispute
as to the inferences to be drawn from the facts, the question becomes one
of law and may be decided by the court." And in Pennsylvania R. Co. v.
Stallings, 165 Md. 615, 619, 170 A. 163, 164 (1933) : "'Undisputed' as used
in these cases must be taken to mean 'uncontested' rather than 'uncontra-
dicted'." See also: Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc. v. Nettie Rosenthal,
185 Md. 416, 45 A. 2d 79 (1945), in which it was held that even though
the facts were not disputed, verdict should not be directed in favor of
party bearing burden of proof since there was a dispute as to a material
inference to be drawn from the facts. Verdict directed for party with
burden of proof in following cases since facts were uncontroverted: Hercu-
les Powder Co. v. Harry J. Campbell Sons Co., 156 Md. 346, 144 A. 510,
62 A. L. R. 1497 (1928) ; Moore v. Clark, 171 Md. 39, 187 A. 887, 107
A. L. R. 924 (1936) ; Albright v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 183 Md. 421, 37 A.
2d 870 (1944) ; National Hauling Contractors Co. v. Baltimore Transit Co.,
185 Md. 158, 44 A. 2d 450 (1945), in which verdict was held to have been
properly directed for defendant on issue of plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence.
"Ibid.
Cited in the decision were: Tweeddale v. Fowler, 114 Md. 344, 79 A.
519 (1911) ; Peane v. Grossnickle, 139 Md. 274, 115 A. 49 (1921) ; Frey
and Sons, Inc. v. Magness, 161 Md. 375, 157 A. 400 (1931). See also,
Garozynski v. Daniel, 57 A. 2d 339 (Md. 1948) upholding a peremptory
instruction for the plaintiff on issue of contributory negligence.
"The plaintiff also assigned as error the lower court's refusal to grant
a judgment n. o. v. in his favor. The Court of Appeals held that the motion
was properly refused, holding that only a party who could properly have
been granted a directed verdict could be given judgment n. o. v.
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"As the plaintiff in the instant case had the burden
of proving all of the issues raised by the pleadings, and
as the defendant had filed the general issue pleas and,
although not expressly denying, did not admit the
truth of plaintiff's testimony, it could not be said that
the facts were uncontroverted, therefore the trial court
correctly ruled when plaintiff's first prayer was re-
jected. 4
The cases in other jurisdictions can be divided into three
general categories. There are first those which, like prior
Maryland cases, lay down the rule that a verdict cannot be
directed in favor of the party having the burden of proof,
even though his evidence be uncontradicted, as long as
the facts are not admitted or agreed upon. 5 Secondly,
there are those cases which do not deny the right of the
party carrying the burden of proof to a directed verdict,
but which impose certain restrictions upon this right,
such as the rule that such party's evidence must not be
oral,'6 or that such evidence must not be that of an "in-
terested" witness. 7 Finally there are those cases which
make no distinction between the party having the burden
of proof and his adversary and hold that a verdict may be
directed for the former under the same conditions that a
verdict will be directed for the latter. 8 This last view
appears to represent the weight of authority and the grow-
ing tendency among the courts has been to adopt it. Ameri-
can Jurisprudence summarizes the view of these cases, as
follows:
"While it is the province of the jury to determine
not only the weight and sufficiency of the evidence,
but the credibility of the witnesses who testify, this
,Italics supplied. Supra, n. 5, 470.
Gwyn Harper Mfg. Co. v. Carolina Central R. Co., 128 N. C. 280, 38
S. E. 894, 83 Am. St. Rep. 675 (1901) ; Printz V. Miller, 233 Mo. 47, 135 S. W.
19 (1911) ; McGlinn Distilling Co. v. -Dervin, 260 Pa. 414, 103 A. 872 (1918).
1" This apparently is the rule in Massachusetts. Goldstein v. D'Arcy, 201
Mass. 312, 87 N. E. 584 (1909) ; Giles v. Giles, 204 Mass. 383, 90 N. E. 595
(1910).
17 Cases collected in 72 A. L. R. 27.
IsBoudeman v. Arnold, 200 Mich. 162, 166 N. W. 985, 8 A. L. R. 789
(1918), and Anno., 8 A. L. R. 796; Chesapeake and Ohio R. Co. v. Martin,
283 U. S. 209 (1931), noted in Practice and Procedure-Demurrer to Evi-
dence-Directing Verdict in Favor of Party Having Burden of Proof (1932),
30 Mich. L. Rev. 474. See also: PROSSER, TORTS (1941), 279 et seq.; Sunder-
land, Directing a Verdict for Party Having the Burden of Proof (1913) 11
Mich. L. Rev. 198 (in which the learned author concludes that the better
rule is that which permits a directed verdict for the party bearing the
'burden of proof irrespective of the character of the evidence).
19501
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rule is not to be taken as necessarily requiring the trial
court to overrule a motion for a directed verdict and
submit a case to the jury in order to permit the jury
to pass upon the credibility of a witness whose testi-
mony is unimpeached and uncontradicted, and rea-
sonably susceptible to but one conclusion. It is true
that in some jurisdictions the rule appears to be that
verdict cannot be directed in favor of the party having
the burden of proof.., but the more generally approved
rule is that it is not only permissible, but proper, for
a trial court to direct a verdict upon unimpeached oral
testimony given in behalf of the party having the
burden of proof, where such testimony is direct, posi-
tive, and unequivocal, is not contradicted either di-
rectly or indirectly, and is not susceptible of inherent
weakness, improbability, or incredibility."'
9
Returning once again to that portion of the opinion in
the instant case in which the Court of Appeals states that
a verdict might have properly been directed in plaintiff's
favor, the query naturally arises as to whether the Court
has indicated a departure from the rule of Alexander v.
Tingle," thus bringing Maryland closer to the rule prevail-
ing in the majority of other jurisdictions as quoted above.
In all of the earlier Maryland cases herein referred to, the
Court of Appeals indicated the possibility for directed
verdicts for parties having the burden of proof only when
the facts were uncontroverted or undisputed, whereas the
language of the instant opinion is in the terms of "the
testimony is undisputed that the cab cut in front of the
automobile and hooked fenders".
As to its own earlier rule, in Dunstan v. Bethlehem
Steel Co.,2 the Court in 1946 recognized the difficulty of
its application to individual cases but seemed to indicate
firm adherence to it, saying: "In Alexander v. Tingle ...
the Court distinguished between (a) uncontradicted evi-
dence which a jury might disbelieve and (b) uncontro-
verted or undisputed facts which present only a question
of law . . .In some of the many cases involving this dis-
tinction, including Alexander v. Tingle, it may be difficult
to reconcile the application of the principle to the facts,
but the principle is beyond question."22
53 Am. Jur., Trial, Sec. 361. See also Secs. 385-389.
Supra, n. 5.
187 Md. 571, 51 A. 2d 288 (1946).
2 Italics supplied. 187 Md. 571, 578, 51 A. 2d 288, 291 (1946).
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The practitioner must for the time being attempt to
judge whether the language in the instant case is but
illustrative of the difficulty of the application of the exist-
ing rule or whether it represents a move of the Court
toward frank recognition that unimpeached and uncontra-
dicted evidence may under proper circumstances call for
a directed verdict even in favor of the party having the
burden of proof.
LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE IN PARKING-
EFFECT OF STATUTE
Hochschild, Kohn & Co. v. Canoles1
The plaintiff's evidence showed that he had parked his
automobile on the lower slope of a city street with the
wheels closely in line with the curb. Witnesses saw the
defendant's oil truck running down the steep incline with
no one in the driver's seat, and with the defendant's driver
vainly running behind the truck in an endeavor to catch it.
The truck struck the plaintiff's automobile, and threw the
plaintiff therefrom with the result that he was permanently
injured. The plaintiff rested his case upon the theory that
the facts recited raised a presumption of negligence on
the part of the defendant. The defendant's evidence showed
that his driver had been in the act of making a delivery
of oil to a customer when he parked on the incline above
the plaintiff. The driver testified that in parking he set the
hand brake as tightly as he could, put the gear in neutral,
turned the wheel of the oil truck slightly to the curb at
about five inches from it, and allowed the motor to con-
tinue running. He then went to the rear of the house to
check the oil tank, returned to the truck, and pulled the
hose to the rear of the house to make the connection. When
the oil truck began to move, the driver testified that he
was a distance of approximately one hundred feet from it.
He ran after the truck but was unable to overtake it. The
driver had previously had trouble with the foot brake, and
had taken the truck to an independent mechanic to have
this brake investigated. In the course of his investigation
the mechanic discovered that the hand brake was not
operating properly. He did not, however, correct the trouble
with the hand brake. The mechanic testified that the ratchet
and pawl of the hand brake were not properly engaged,
166 A. 2d 780 (Md. 1949).
